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‘A Political Monopoly Held by One Race’:
The Politicisation of Ethnicity in Colonial
Rwanda
	
  
Deborah Mayersen
The University of Queensland

	
  
In at least some parts of Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi
subgroups have existed since pre-colonial times. Under
German and Belgian colonial rule, the distinction between
the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority was perceived as a
racial distinction. The Tutsi minority was regarded as
racially superior, and given privileged access to education
and indigenous positions of authority. Over time, this
perception of Tutsi superiority was both institutionalized
and internalised within Rwandan society. The ‘Hutu
Awakening’ during the 1950s, however, saw issues
surrounding race and privilege become highly politicised.
As decolonisation loomed, the intersections between race
and power became sites of bitter contestation. The Tutsi
elite, long accustomed to their privileged status, sought to
retain their hegemony through a rapid transition to
independence utilising the existing power structure. The
nascent Hutu counter-elite, by contrast, desperately
sought access to the organs of power, lest they be
‘condemned forever to the role of subordinate manual
workers, and this, worse still, after achieving an
independence which they will have unwittingly helped to
obtain’ (Niyonzima and others 1957: 3). Utilising a range
of primary documents from the period, including
manifestos of political parties, statements of leaders, and
documents tabled at the United Nations Trusteeship
Council, this paper
will analyse the intersection of race and politics during the
last decade of colonial rule in Rwanda. The roots of the
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ethnic hatred that led to the 1994 genocide can be traced
to this period of great ethnic tension.

	
  

Introduction

	
  

“The most advanced elements among the Bahutu are
stirring, and beginning to make overt demands”, reported
the United Nations (UN) Visiting Mission to the Trust
Territory of Rwanda in 1957 (15).1 Under the auspices of
the UN Trusteeship Council, the triennial missions to this
Belgian colony had both oversight and advisory functions.
The previous mission, in 1954, had declared “There
appeared to be very little development of general or even
local public opinion” (United Nations 1954: 2) in the
country; by 1960, however, the subsequent mission
reported on the first major interethnic violence there
(United Nations 1960). In a remarkably short period,
relations between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority
had become highly politicised, polarised, bitter and
violent. Racially motivated violence plagued the country
during the independence process. By July 1962, when the
country declared independence, some 100,000 Tutsi had
fled as refugees (Webster 1966: 84); just eighteen
months later ethnic massacres would claim the lives of 1014,000 Tutsi (Segal 1964: 15; Lemarchand 1970: 225).
This chapter will analyse how, and why, issues
surrounding ethnicity so quickly became critical during the
decolonisation period. It proposes that between 1954 and
1959, when ethnicity emerged as a major political issue in
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The UN Trust Territory was officially the Trust Territory of
Ruanda-Urundi, but Rwanda and Burundi were administered
separately. Statements utilised throughout this paper from Trust
Territory documents and reports refer to Rwanda only. For
consistency, modern spelling of Rwanda is utilised throughout,
however original spelling is retained within direct quotes.

	
  

168	
  

Mayersen: Ethnicity in Rwanda

Rwanda, three key factors combined to provoke extreme
levels of ethnic polarisation. Together, these explain the
high levels of interethnic violence that surrounded
Rwanda’s birth as a nation.
	
  

Background

	
  
Rwanda has a long history of ethnic diversity, with the
majority Hutu comprising approximately 85 per cent of the
population, and the minority Tutsi 15 per cent.2 A third
group, the Twa, comprise less than 1 per cent. In at least
some parts of the country, Hutu and Tutsi subgroups have
existed since pre-colonial times. Tutsi were traditionally
pastoralists, with a small Tutsi elite comprising the ruling
class, while Hutu were traditionally agriculturalists, of
generally lower status. The distinction between the Hutu
majority and Tutsi minority subgroups has been varyingly
described as one of race, tribe, caste, class, domination
and subjugation, ethnicity and political identity. Each
descriptor appears to have more than a kernel of truth,
but also elements of distortion and inaccuracy. Moreover,
the nature of these identities is not a static one, as they
have changed over time and in response to both internal
and external influences. Whereas today these identities
are commonly referred to as ethnic identities (and will be
referred to as such within this chapter), for much of
Rwanda’s history they were considered racial. For most of
the period of German (1894-1916) and Belgian (19161962) colonial rule, the Tutsi minority was regarded as
2

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

A note on the terminology used in this chapter. Kinyarwanda
is a language that uses prefixes extensively, but in conformance
with general practice in academic writing on Rwanda, the terms
‘Hutu’, ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Twa’ will be used without prefixes, to denote
both singular and plural. In Kinyarwanda the prefix ‘mu’ denotes
singular, and ‘ba’ plural. Where quotes include these prefixes,
they have not been altered.
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racially superior, and given privileged access to education
and indigenous positions of authority.3 Over time, this
perception of Tutsi superiority was both institutionalised
and internalised within Rwandan society. Even as late as
1959, Belgium’s annual report to the UN on the Trust
Territory helpfully included a photo of the Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa ‘racial types’ (type de race) (Belgian Government
1959).
Belgium managed the Trust Territory of Rwanda through a
system of indirect rule, utilising the indigenous Tutsi elite
to implement a range of policies. For the first three
decades of its rule, most of these policies were economic
and developmental. In the wake of World War Two,
however, new challenges arose. The new United Nations
mandate advocated rapid political development and
preparation for independence in the colony. Triennial
Visiting Missions insisted on the first steps towards the
democratisation of the indigenous political system. At the
same time, a new generation of Catholic missionaries and
clergy brought anti-racial and egalitarian values to
Rwanda after experiencing the Holocaust in Europe
(Mamdani 2001; Linden 1977). Many Hutu children were
now receiving a rudimentary education, there were
increased opportunities for Hutu in the emerging monetary
economy, and through further education in the
seminaries. These factors led to the emergence of a Hutu
consciousness in the mid-1950s, or what has been dubbed
the ‘Hutu awakening’. For the first time, race became a
3

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

Germany was ‘allocated’ territory that included Rwanda at the
Berlin Conference in 1885, but the first German to arrive in the
country did not do so until 1894. Belgium occupied Rwanda in
1916 in the course of World War One, the legitimacy of the
occupation was confirmed under a League of Nations mandate in
1923.

	
  

170	
  

Mayersen: Ethnicity in Rwanda

contested political issue. In just a few short years, HutuTutsi divisions led to the first major outbreak of interethnic
violence, the Hutu uprisings of November 1959.
	
  

Interethnic Violence

	
  
Arguably, three key factors combine to explain the very
rapid and extreme polarisation of Hutu-Tutsi divisions, and
the resulting interethnic violence. First, the critical nature
of this issue to the nascent Hutu counter-elite cannot be
underestimated. For this first generation of politically
conscious Hutu, race was not one political problem
amongst the many challenges that beset Rwanda, but the
central issue, and the lens through which all other
developmental issues were approached. In March 1957
this became apparent with the publication of the Bahutu
Manifesto. Signed by nine members of the Hutu counterelite, including future Rwandan president Grégoire
Kayibanda, it has been described as “probably the most
important document in modern Rwandan political
development” (Wagoner 1968: 158). The Bahutu
Manifesto challenged every facet of Rwandan society:
Some people have asked whether this is a social or a racial
conflict … In reality and in the minds of men it is both. It can,
however, be narrowed down for it is primarily a question of a
political monopoly held by one race, the Mututsi, and, in view of
the social situation as a whole, it has become an economic and
social monopoly. In view, also, of the de facto selection in
education, this political, economic and social monopoly has also
become a cultural monopoly, to the great despair of the Bahutu,
who see themselves condemned forever to the role of
subordinate manual workers, and this, worse still, after achieving
an independence which they will have unwittingly helped to
obtain (Niyonzima and others 1957: 3).

The Bahutu Manifesto identified a range of problems
facing Rwanda and even proposed numerous solutions –
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all of them highlighting a fundamental racial component.
Thus integral to Rwanda’s economic development was
reform of the land ownership system, based upon
traditional Tutsi privilege; while integral to education
development was equitable access to education and
government-funded scholarships (Niyonzima and others
1957). Political development required “that Bahutu should
in fact be promoted to public office”, and that positions
such as sub-chiefs and chiefs should be elected by
taxpayers (Niyonzima and others 1957: 8). For the Hutu
counter-elite, the fundamental problem was Tutsi racial
privilege, and addressing this issue was crucial for all
areas of Rwanda’s political and economic development.
The Bahutu Manifesto was prepared to highlight the
critical issue of race relations to the 1957 UN Visiting
Mission. The Visiting Mission also received a starkly
different account of race relations in Rwanda, however, in
Mise au Point, the Statement of Views. Published by the
Superior Council, comprising Rwanda’s Tutsi political elite,
the Statement of Views also viewed race relations as “the
fundamental problem in our country now” (High Council of
State 1957: Annex II). Yet astonishingly, this statement
was not referring to the problems of Hutu-Tutsi race
relations – which did not rate a mention in the entire
document – but race relations between whites and nonwhites in the country. This highlights the high degree of
racial awareness and the hierarchical nature of Rwandan
society, but also a strong desire to de-emphasise the
Hutu-Tutsi distinction and recast Rwanda as a
homogenous nation in a bid for the elite to retain its
power (Atterbury 1970). The primary focus of the
Statement of Views was on preparing Rwanda for rapid
independence, through proper training, recognition and
utilisation of the current indigenous elite (Wagoner 1968).
Self-government was an interim goal, and the Statement
noted “It would be difficult at the present to specify when
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it will be possible to grant us self-government, but we are
anxious that we should be trained for self-government
now” (High Council of State 1957: Annex II). The
Superior Council’s desire for rapid self-government, and
omission of the Hutu-Tutsi issue, reflected an awareness
of the potential threat posed by the nascent Hutu political
movement, and a response designed “so they, the Tutsi,
could use the machinery of government to maintain their
power” (Webster 1966: 40). Both the Bahutu Manifesto
and the Statement of Views were key documents in that
they “provided the ideological basis for much of the
political action which followed” (Webster 1966: 40; Harroy
1984: 237).
The second factor that contributed to the rapid ethnic
polarisation of Rwanda during this period is the lack of
responsiveness of both the Belgian colonial authorities and
the UN Visiting Missions to this critical issue. Despite the
Bahutu Manifesto and the Statement of Views, arguably
neither authority realised the importance or disintegrative
potential of the race relations issue prior to late 1959.
The 1954 Visiting Mission completed failed to mention the
problem of sub-group identity, and it was left to the
Belgians to point this out in criticising their report (United
Nations 1955: 47). Yet the Belgian authorities themselves
made no attempts to address the issue. In 1956, a
proposal to include Hutu representation on the (colonialled) General Council of Ruanda-Urundi was defeated,
leading its only proponent to resign. In a parting shot, Mr.
Maus bemoaned “the conflict of interests between the
Tutsi and Hutu communities which is the most pressing
social problem and the most poignant human drama in the
Territory, will therefore continue to be officially ignored by
our institutions” (United Nations 1960: 40).
The Bahutu Manifesto and Statement of Views ensured at
least some level of official acknowledgement of the race
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relations issue in 1957, but led to little real action. The
UN Visiting Mission welcomed “the increasing rate at which
the traditional society in Ruanda-Urundi is adapting itself
to modern democratic ideas and forms” (United Nations
1957: 9). Yet it also acknowledged, for the first time, that
the acceleration of political development for which
previous Missions had pressed so strenuously might be a
cause of political turmoil (Rawson 1966):
The inevitable disintegration of such a civilisation [traditional
Rwandan society] on contact with the modern world and its
replacement by new forms may give rise to serious difficulties in
spite of all the Administering Authority’s vigilance (United
Nations 1957: 12).

While noting the “especially delicate stage” of Rwanda’s
political development, it had little to offer of value, with
hazy statements such as “Without minimising the danger
of haste, the Mission believes that over-cautiousness is no
less dangerous” (United Nations 1957: 12). The only
practical suggestion it proposed – with extraordinary
optimism – was further education:
Under the influence of secondary and university education and of
contact with the outside world, traditional conceptions are giving
way and the elite of the old regime are coming up against a new
elite. It will not be long – and indeed there are already
indications of this – before the traditional political structure and
the respect for feudal institutions will be as irksome to the rising
generation of young educated Batutsi as to the new Bahutu elite
(United Nations 1957: 23).

The 1957 Mission appeared to seriously underestimate
both the importance and severity of the issues
surrounding race relations in Rwanda.
There is conflicting evidence as to how seriously the
Belgian Administering Authorities regarded the Hutu-Tutsi
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problem. Certainly they recognised the “deep cleavages
which divide the Batutsi, the Bahutu [and] the Batwa ...
Those cleavages are obvious ... and they dominate the
whole of social life” (United Nations 1955: 47). But the
stratified nature of society in Rwanda had been
uncontested for decades – and indeed utilised as the basis
of indirect rule – and the new Hutu challenge to Tutsi
domination appears not to have been perceived as a
pressing issue prior to the Hutu uprising in late 1959.
Afterwards, this rapidly changed, and the report of the
1960 Visiting Mission claimed that “In his discussions with
the 1957 Visiting Mission, the Governor described relations
between the Tutsi and Hutu as the key problem of the
Territory” (United Nations 1960: 42). But if that was the
case, it was not clearly described as such in either the
1957 report, or Belgium’s annual reports on the Trust
Territory. Indeed, a careful reading of documents during
this period suggests that Vice-Governor General Jean-Paul
Harroy did not concede until December 1958 that “the
Hutu-Tutsi question posed an undeniable problem” – some
twenty-two months after the Bahutu Manifesto’s
publication (Lemarchand 1970: 152).
To the extent that the problem was recognised, the
Administering Authorities appeared unsure how to address
it. The General Council of Ruanda-Urundi passed a motion
to study the Manifesto, but repeatedly postponed
discussion of the Hutu-Tutsi polarisation (United Nations
1960). Governor Harroy initially adopted a stance that
aligned closely with the position of the Tutsi elite,
suggesting that the Hutu-Tutsi problem was largely an
economic (rather than racial) issue, and warning of
‘misuse’ of the terms Hutu and Tutsi (United Nations
1960). This aligned with the Administration’s early position
in favour of abolishing the terms Hutu and Tutsi – a
position advocated by the Tutsi elite but strongly opposed
in the Bahutu Manifesto for its potential to mask
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discrimination (Niyonzima et al 1957: 11). As the
democratisation process gathered pace ahead of
anticipated independence, it did so in an environment of
increasing polarisation.
The third, critical factor that contributed to the extremity
of the ethnic polarisation was the confluence of the race
relations issue with the democratisation and independence
process. The rapid pace of decolonisation precluded the
use of longer term conciliatory and ameliorative policies
that might have improved Hutu-Tutsi relations over time.
Rather, each side perceived the issue as immediate rather
than chronic, and one that must be resolved prior to
independence. Increasingly, that resolution came to be
visualised as through a ‘victory’ of one group at the
expense of the other. By 1959 the disastrous potential of
the convergence of the race relations issue and the
independence process was clear. Observer M.A.
Munyangaju summed up the atmosphere on 30 January:
The situation is very tense between Bahutu and Batutsi. A small
quarrel would be enough for starting off a ranged battle. The
Batutsi realise that after this, everything is finished for them and
are preparing for the last chance. The Bahutu also see that a
trial of strength is in the making and do not wish to give up
(Quoted in Bhattacharyya 1967: 218).

Race was the political issue when political parties were
allowed to form. Thus the founding charter of Union
Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), the party of the Tutsi elite,
declared in August 1959:
Although the Ruandais society is composed of individuals of
highly unequal value, and it is not equitable to accord the same
value to the vulgar thoughts of the ordinary man as to the
perspicacious judgment of the capable ... Although universal
suffrage will infallibly end in the enslavement of the educated
minority by an uncultivated majority ... It is nevertheless
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impossible to refuse universal suffrage to the Bahutu. An open
opposition will provide one more argument to the colonists
whose civilisation ... [and] loyalty is now known (UNAR Charter,
in Nkundabagenzi 1961, translation utilised from Bhattacharyya
1967: 248).

The most popular Hutu party, Mouvement Démocratique
Rwandais / Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu
(MDR-PARMEHUTU), announced its goal as “a true union
of all the Rwandan people without any race dominating
another as is the case today” (Manifeste-Programme du
Parmehutu 1959, in Nkundabagenzi 1961: 113). The few,
quiet proponents of moderation received little support.
The bitterness of the debate is further illustrated by a
September 1959 press release from the Hutu social party
APROSOMA, which began “The plans of the Tutsi party in
Ruanda – representing the Tutsi who are exploiters by
nature, zenophobes [sic] by instinct and communists by
necessity ...” (United Nations 1959:1). By November of
1959, these divisive, race-based politics contributed to the
outbreak of the Hutu uprising, the first major incident of
interethnic violence in the country.
	
  

Conclusion

	
  
Ultimately, Rwanda was nation forged from a violent,
divisive and racially-driven independence process. After
the 1959 uprising, race relations continued to polarise and
radicalise, despite some moderating efforts by the Belgian
colonial authorities and the UN Trusteeship authorities.
There were repeated incidents of ethnic violence through
to the nation’s independence in July 1962 and beyond. For
the Tutsi elite and Hutu counter-elite, at least, the
potential for this polarisation had been apparent from
1957. As the 1960 Visiting Mission to Rwanda remarked
about the Bahutu Manifesto and the Statement of Views:

	
  

177	
  

Mayersen: Ethnicity in Rwanda

Those two documents contain the germ of all the ideological
elements which inspired the disturbances of November 1959 and
led to the Visiting Mission being received in Ruanda in March
1960 with mutually contradictory slogans: “Immediate
independence. Get rid of the Belgians for us” and “Down with
Tutsi feudalism. Long live Belgian Trusteeship” (United Nations
1960: 41-42).

Yet neither the Belgian Administration nor the Visiting
Missions appear to have fully appreciated the critical
nature of the race relations issue until it resulted in the
first major outbreak of violence. It can only be speculated
as to whether earlier recognition of the critical nature of
race relations by the colonial authorities, and a more
decisive response to the emerging polarisation, could have
averted some of the violence that eventually resulted.
Unfortunately, however, by the time the severity of the
issue was properly recognised, the political environment
was already highly polarised and opportunities for
reconciliation severely circumscribed. Rwanda was born a
nation divided.
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